Martin v. Hadix, 527 U.S. 343, 28 (1999)

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370

MARTIN v. HADIX

Opinion of Ginsburg, J.

through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client."). Counsel's actions before and after that date are thus "inextricab[ly] part of a course of conduct initiated prior to the law." Inmates of D. C. Jail v. Jackson, 158 F. 3d 1357, 1362 (CADC 1998) (Wald, J., dissenting).

While the injustice in applying the fee limitations to pending actions may be more readily apparent regarding work performed before the PLRA's effective date, application of the statute to work performed thereafter in pending cases also frustrates reasonable reliance on prior law and court-approved market rates. Consider, for example, two attorneys who filed similar prison reform lawsuits at the same time, pre-PLRA. Both attorneys initiated their lawsuits in the expectation that, if they prevailed, they would earn the market rate anticipated by pre-PLRA law. In one case, the lawsuit progressed swiftly, and labor-intensive pretrial discovery was completed before April 26, 1996. In the other, the suit lagged through no fault of plaintiff's counsel, pending the court's disposition of threshold motions, and the attorney was unable to pursue discovery until after April 26, 1996.3 Both attorneys have prosecuted their claims with due diligence; both were obliged, having accepted the representations, to perform the work for which they seek compensation. There is scarcely greater injustice in denying pre-PLRA compensation for pretrial discovery in the one case than the other. Nor is there any reason to think that Congress intended these similarly situated attorneys to be treated differently.

The Court avoids a conclusion of retroactivity by dismissing as an unsupported assumption the attorneys' assertion of an obligation to continue their representations through to

3 If counsel's conduct caused delay or protraction, the court could properly exercise discretion to deny or reduce the attorney's fee. See 42 U. S. C. § 1988(b) (1994 ed., Supp. III) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow . . . a reasonable attorney's fee.").

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