410
Ginsburg, J., dissenting
drawn, unquestionably sought to convey this core information: If the jurors did not agree on death, then the only sentencing option, for jury or judge, would be life without possibility of release. Jones also objected, on vagueness grounds, to two of the three nonstatutory aggravators proposed by the Government. See id., at 21-22, 28.
The District Court rejected Jones's proposed instructions nos. 4 and 5 and refused to strike or modify the nonstatutory aggravators to which Jones had objected. See id., at 33. The trial court instructed the jury that it could recommend death, life without possibility of release, or a lesser sentence, in which event the court would decide what the lesser sentence would be. See id., at 44.
The jury apparently found the case close. It rejected three of the seven aggravators the Government urged. See 132 F. 3d, at 238.11 And one or more jurors found each of the specific mitigating factors submitted by Jones. See
ment without possibility of release. In the event, after due deliberation and reflection, the jury is unable to agree on a unanimous decision as to the sentence to be imposed, you should so advise me and I will impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release. . . .
"In the event you are unable to agree on Life Without Possibility of Release or Death, but you are unanimous that the sentence should not be less than Life Without Possibility of Release, you should report that vote to the Court and the Court will sentence the defendant to Life Without the Possibility of Release." App. 14-15.
In "Defendant's Objections to the Court's Charge," Jones "particularly direct[ed] the court's attention" to his proposed instruction no. 5. Id., at 25, 30.
11 The jury rejected the following aggravators: (1) the crime involved substantial planning and premeditation, see 18 U. S. C. § 3592(c)(9); (2) the crime created a grave risk to a person other than the victim, see § 3592(c)(5); and (3) Jones posed a future danger to the lives and safety of other persons. It found as aggravators: (1) Jones killed the victim during the commission of kidnaping, see § 3592(c)(1); (2) the crime was especially heinous, cruel, and depraved, see § 3592(c)6); (3) the victim's young age, slight stature, background, and unfamiliarity with San Angelo, Texas; and (4) the victim's personal characteristics and the effect of the offense on her family. See 132 F. 3d, at 238, and nn. 1, 2.
Page: Index Previous 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007