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Syllabus
ber—are insufficient. Finally, the Illinois Supreme Court is correct that General Order 92-4 is not a sufficient limitation on police discretion. See Smith v. Goguen, 415 U. S. 566, 575. Pp. 60-64.
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg, concluded in Parts III, IV, and VI:
1. It was not improper for the state courts to conclude that the ordinance, which covers a significant amount of activity in addition to the intimidating conduct that is its factual predicate, is invalid on its face. An enactment may be attacked on its face as impermissibly vague if, inter alia, it fails to establish standards for the police and public that are sufficient to guard against the arbitrary deprivation of liberty. Ko-lender v. Lawson, 461 U. S., at 358. The freedom to loiter for innocent purposes is part of such "liberty." See, e. g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U. S. 116, 126. The ordinance's vagueness makes a facial challenge appropriate. This is not an enactment that simply regulates business behavior and contains a scienter requirement. See Hoffman Estates v. Flip-side, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U. S. 489, 499. It is a criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement, see Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U. S. 379, 395, and infringes on constitutionally protected rights, see id., at 391. Pp. 51-56.
2. Because the ordinance fails to give the ordinary citizen adequate notice of what is forbidden and what is permitted, it is impermissibly vague. See, e. g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U. S. 611, 614. The term "loiter" may have a common and accepted meaning, but the ordinance's definition of that term—"to remain in any one place with no apparent purpose"—does not. It is difficult to imagine how any Chicagoan standing in a public place with a group of people would know if he or she had an "apparent purpose." This vagueness about what loitering is covered and what is not dooms the ordinance. The city's principal response to the adequate notice concern—that loiterers are not subject to criminal sanction until after they have disobeyed a dispersal order— is unpersuasive for at least two reasons. First, the fair notice require-ment's purpose is to enable the ordinary citizen to conform his or her conduct to the law. See Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 453. A dispersal order, which is issued only after prohibited conduct has occurred, cannot retroactively provide adequate notice of the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible applications of the ordinance. Second, the dispersal order's terms compound the inadequacy of the notice afforded by the ordinance, which vaguely requires that the officer "order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves from the area," and thereby raises a host of questions as to the duration and distinguishing features of the loiterers' separation. Pp. 56-60.
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