Cite as: 527 U. S. 465 (1999)
Per Curiam
quirement. We made this clear in United States v. Ross, 456 U. S. 798, 809 (1982), when we said that in cases where there was probable cause to search a vehicle "a search is not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even though a warrant has not been actually obtained." (Emphasis added.) In a case with virtually identical facts to this one (even down to the bag of cocaine in the trunk of the car), Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U. S. 938 (1996) (per curiam), we repeated that the automobile exception does not have a separate exigency requirement: "If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment . . . permits police to search the vehicle without more." Id., at 940.
In this case, the Court of Special Appeals found that there was "abundant probable cause" that the car contained contraband. This finding alone satisfies the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, a conclusion correctly reached by the trial court when it denied respondent's motion to suppress. The holding of the Court of Special Appeals that the "automobile exception" requires a separate finding of exigency in addition to a finding of probable cause is squarely contrary to our holdings in Ross and Labron. We therefore grant the petition for writ of certiorari and reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals.*
It is so ordered.
*Justice Breyer in dissent suggests that we should not summarily reverse a judgment in a criminal case, even though he agrees with this opinion as a matter of law. But to adopt that position would simply leave it in the hands of a respondent—who had obtained a lower court judgment manifestly wrong as a matter of federal constitutional law—to avoid summary reversal by the simple expedient of refusing to file a response. While we have on occasion appointed an attorney to file a brief as amicus curiae in a case where we have granted certiorari, in order to be sure that the argued case is fully briefed, we have never done so in cases which we have summarily reversed. The reason for this is that a summary reversal does not decide any new or unanswered question of law, but simply corrects a lower court's demonstrably erroneous application of federal law.
467
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007