Cite as: 527 U. S. 526 (1999)
Syllabus
ute's structure imply an independent role for "egregiousness" in the face of congressional silence. On the contrary, the view that § 1981a provides for punitive awards based solely on an employer's state of mind is consistent with the 1991 Act's distinction between equitable and compensatory relief. Intent determines which remedies are open to a plaintiff here as well. This focus on the employer's state of mind does give effect to the statute's two-tiered structure. The terms "malice" and "reckless indifference" pertain not to the employer's awareness that it is engaging in discrimination, but to its knowledge that it may be acting in violation of federal law, see, e. g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U. S. 30, 37, n. 6, 41, 50. There will be circumstances where intentional discrimination does not give rise to punitive damages liability under this standard, as where the employer is unaware of the relevant federal prohibition or discriminates with the distinct belief that its discrimination is lawful, where the underlying theory of discrimination is novel or otherwise poorly recognized, or where the employer reasonably believes that its discrimination satisfies a bona fide occupational qualification defense or other statutory exception to liability. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-gins, 507 U. S. 604, 616, 617. Although there is some support for respondent's assertion that the common law punitive awards tradition includes an "egregious misconduct" requirement, eligibility for such awards most often is characterized in terms of a defendant's evil motive or intent. Egregious or outrageous acts may serve as evidence supporting an inference of such evil motive, but § 1981a does not limit plaintiffs to this form of evidence or require a showing of egregious or outrageous discrimination independent of the employer's state of mind. Pp. 533-539.
2. The inquiry does not end with a showing of the requisite mental state by certain employees, however. Petitioner must impute liability for punitive damages to respondent. Common law limitations on a principal's vicarious liability for its agents' acts apply in the Title VII context. See, e. g., Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U. S. 742, 754. The Court's discussion of this question is informed by the general common law of agency, as codified in the Restatement (Second) of Agency, see, e. g., id., at 755, which, among other things, authorizes punitive damages "against a . . . principal because of an [agent's] act . . . if . . . the agent was employed in a managerial capacity and was acting in the scope of employment," § 217 C(c), and declares that even intentional, specifically forbidden torts are within such scope if the conduct is "the kind [the employee] is employed to perform," "occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits," and "is actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the" employer, §§ 228(1), 230, Comment b. Under these rules, even an employer who made every good faith
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