562
Opinion of the Court
ance with a Government regulation as the justification for its vision requirement because the waiver program, which Albertson's disregarded, was "a lawful and legitimate part of the DOT regulatory scheme." Id., at 1236. The Court of Appeals conceded that Albertson's was free to set a vision standard different from that mandated by the DOT, but held that under the ADA, Albertson's would have to justify its independent standard as necessary to prevent " 'a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.' " Ibid. (quoting 42 U. S. C. § 12113(b)). Although the court suggested that Albertson's might be able to make such a showing on remand, 143 F. 3d, at 1236, it ultimately took the position that the company could not, interpreting petitioner's rejection of DOT waivers as flying in the face of the judgment about safety already embodied in the DOT's decision to grant them, id., at 1237.
Judge Rymer dissented. She contended that Albertson's had properly relied on the basic DOT vision standards in refusing to accept waivers because, when Albertson's fired Kirkingburg, the waiver program did not rest upon "a rule or a regulation with the force of law," but was merely a way of gathering data to use in deciding whether to refashion the still-applicable vision standards. Id., at 1239.
II
Though we need not speak to the issue whether Kirk-ingburg was an individual with a disability in order to resolve this case, that issue falls within the first question on which we granted certiorari,8 525 U. S. 1064 (1999), and we think it worthwhile to address it briefly in order to correct three missteps the Ninth Circuit made in its discussion of the matter. Under the ADA:
8 "Whether a monocular individual is 'disabled' per se, under the Americans with Disabilities Act." Pet. for Cert. i (citation omitted).
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