Cite as: 527 U. S. 581 (1999)
Opinion of the Court
The ADA stepped up earlier measures to secure opportunities for people with developmental disabilities to enjoy the benefits of community living. The Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, a 1975 measure, stated in aspirational terms that "[t]he treatment, services, and habilitation for a person with developmental disabilities . . . should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal liberty." 89 Stat. 502, 42 U. S. C. § 6010(2) (1976 ed.) (emphasis added); see also Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U. S. 1, 24 (1981) (concluding that the § 6010 provisions "were intended to be hortatory, not mandatory"). In a related legislative endeavor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Congress used mandatory language to proscribe discrimination against persons with disabilities. See 87 Stat. 394, as amended, 29 U. S. C. § 794 (1976 ed.) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal fi-statutory prohibitions against 'discrimination' have not wavered from this path," post, at 616, and that "a plaintiff cannot prove 'discrimination' by demonstrating that one member of a particular protected group has been favored over another member of that same group," post, at 618. The dissent is incorrect as a matter of precedent and logic. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U. S. 308, 312 (1996) (The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 "does not ban discrimination against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination against employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those who are 40 or older. The fact that one person in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age."); cf. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U. S. 75, 76 (1998) ("[W]orkplace harassment can violate Title VII's prohibition against 'discriminat[ion] . . . because of . . . sex,' 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), when the harasser and the harassed employee are of the same sex."); Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Assn., 615 F. 2d 1025, 1032 (CA5 1980) ("[D]iscrimination against black females can exist even in the absence of discrimination against black men or white women.").
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