64
Opinion of O'Connor, J.
safely assume that they would not be ordered to disperse no matter how innocent and harmless their loitering might be.
VI
In our judgment, the Illinois Supreme Court correctly concluded that the ordinance does not provide sufficiently specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the police "to meet constitutional standards for definiteness and clarity." 35
177 Ill. 2d, at 459, 687 N. E. 2d, at 64. We recognize the serious and difficult problems testified to by the citizens of Chicago that led to the enactment of this ordinance. "We are mindful that the preservation of liberty depends in part on the maintenance of social order." Houston v. Hill, 482 U. S. 451, 471-472 (1987). However, in this instance the city has enacted an ordinance that affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the public streets.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is
Affirmed.
Justice O'Connor, with whom Justice Breyer joins, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment.
I agree with the Court that Chicago's Gang Congregation Ordinance, Chicago Municipal Code § 8-4-015 (1992) (gang loitering ordinance or ordinance) is unconstitutionally vague. A penal law is void for vagueness if it fails to "define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited" or fails to
35 This conclusion makes it unnecessary to reach the question whether the Illinois Supreme Court correctly decided that the ordinance is invalid as a deprivation of substantive due process. For this reason, Justice Thomas, see post, at 102-106, and Justice Scalia, see post, at 85-86, are mistaken when they assert that our decision must be analyzed under the framework for substantive due process set out in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702 (1997).
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