College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 15 (1999)

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680

COLLEGE SAVINGS BANK v. FLORIDA PREPAID POSTSECONDARY ED. EXPENSE BD.

Opinion of the Court

as the operation of a police force; but constructive waiver is appropriate where a State runs an enterprise for profit, operates in a field traditionally occupied by private persons or corporations, engages in activities sufficiently removed from "core [state] functions," Reply Brief for United States 3, or otherwise acts as a "market participant" in interstate commerce, cf. White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U. S. 204, 206-208 (1983). On this theory, Florida Prepaid constructively waived its immunity from suit by engaging in the voluntary and nonessential activity of selling and advertising a for-profit educational investment vehicle in interstate commerce after being put on notice by the clear language of the TRCA that it would be subject to Lanham Act liability for doing so.

We think that the constructive-waiver experiment of Parden was ill conceived, and see no merit in attempting to salvage any remnant of it. As we explain below in detail, Parden broke sharply with prior cases, and is fundamentally incompatible with later ones. We have never applied the holding of Parden to another statute, and in fact have narrowed the case in every subsequent opinion in which it has been under consideration. In short, Parden stands as an anomaly in the jurisprudence of sovereign immunity, and indeed in the jurisprudence of constitutional law. Today, we drop the other shoe: Whatever may remain of our decision in Parden is expressly overruled.

To begin with, we cannot square Parden with our cases requiring that a State's express waiver of sovereign immunity be unequivocal. See, e. g., Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U. S. 47 (1944). The whole point of requiring a "clear declaration" by the State of its waiver is to be certain that the State in fact consents to suit. But there is little reason to assume actual consent based upon the State's mere presence in a field subject to congressional regulation. There is a fundamental difference between a State's expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity and Congress's

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