Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 98 (1999)

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Cite as: 527 U. S. 706 (1999)

Souter, J., dissenting

government's immunity from private suit, it is not dignity.35

See United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 208 (1882).

It is equally puzzling to hear the Court say that "federal power to authorize private suits for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens." Ante, at 750- 751. So long as the citizens' will, expressed through state legislation, does not violate valid federal law, the strain will not be felt; and to the extent that state action does violate federal law, the will of the citizens of the United States already trumps that of the citizens of the State: the strain then is not only expected, but necessarily intended.

Least of all does the Court persuade by observing that "other important needs" than that of the "judgment creditor" compete for public money, ante, at 751. The "judgment creditor" in question is not a dunning bill collector, but a citizen whose federal rights have been violated, and a constitutional structure that stints on enforcing federal rights out of an abundance of delicacy toward the States has substituted politesse in place of respect for the rule of law.36

35 Furthermore, the very idea of dignity ought also to imply that the State should be subject to, and not outside of, the law. It is surely ironic that one of the loci classici of Roman law regarding the imperial prerogative begins with (and is known by) the assertion that it is appropriate to the Emperor's dignity that he acknowledge (or, on some readings, at least claim) that he is bound by the laws. See Digna Vox, Justinian's Code 1.4.14 ("Digna vox maiestate regnantis legis alligatum se principem profiteri") ("It is a statement worthy of the majesty of the ruler for the Prince to profess himself bound by the laws"); see Pennington, The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600, at 78, and n. 6.

36 The Court also claims that subjecting States to suit puts power in the hands of state courts that the State may wish to assign to its legislature, thus assigning the state judiciary a role "foreign to its experience but beyond its competence . . . ." Ante, at 752. This comes perilously close to legitimizing political defiance of valid federal law.

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