Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 66 (1999)

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880

ORTIZ v. FIBREBOARD CORP.

Breyer, J., dissenting

ventory clients—would have " 'jeopardiz[ed] any effort at serious negotiations' " and "resulted in a less favorable settlement" for the class, or perhaps no settlement followed by no insurance policy either. Id., at 402a.

The Fifth Circuit found that "[t]he record amply supports" these District Court findings. 90 F. 3d, at 978. Does the majority mean to set them aside? If not, does it mean to set forth a rigid principle of law, such as the principle that asbestos lawyers with clients outside a class, who will potentially benefit from a class settlement, can never represent a class in settlement negotiations? And does that principle apply no matter how unusual the circumstances, or no matter how necessary that representation might be? Why should there be such a rule of law? If there is not an absolute rule, however, I do not see how this Court can hold that the case before us is not that unusual situation.

Consider next the claim that "equity" required more subclasses. Ante, at 855-857. To determine the "right" number of subclasses, a district court must weigh the advantages and disadvantages of bringing more lawyers into the case. The majority concedes as much when it says "at some point there must be an end to reclassification with separate counsel." Ante, at 857. The District Court said that if there had "been as many separate attorneys" as the objectors wanted, "there is a significant possibility that a global settlement would not have been reached before the Coverage Case was resolved by the California Court of Appeal." App. to Pet. for Cert. 428a. Finding of Fact ¶ 346 lists the shared common interests among subclasses that argue for single representation, including "avoiding the potentially disastrous results of a loss . . . in the Coverage Case," "maximizing the total settlement contribution," "reducing transaction costs and delays," "minimizing . . . attorney's fees," and "adopting" equitable claims payment "procedures." Id., at 415a. Surely the District Court was within its discretion to conclude that "the point" to which the majority alludes was reached in this case.

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