164
Breyer, J., concurring
Price, 334 U. S., at 285-286. Meanwhile the rules governing appeals in California, and presumably those in other States as well, seem to protect the ability of indigent litigants to make pro se filings. See, e. g., People v. Wende, 25 Cal. 3d 436, 440, 600 P. 2d 1071, 1074 (1979); see also Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967). In requiring Martinez, under these circumstances, to accept against his will a state-appointed attorney, the California courts have not deprived him of a constitutional right. Accordingly, the judgment of the California Supreme Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
Justice Kennedy, concurring.
To resolve this case it is unnecessary to cast doubt upon the rationale of Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975). Faretta can be accepted as quite sound, yet it does not follow that a convicted person has a similar right of self-representation on appeal. Different considerations apply in the appellate system, and the Court explains why this is so. With these observations, I join the opinion of the Court.
Justice Breyer, concurring.
I agree with the Court and join its opinion. Because Justice Scalia writes separately to underscore the continuing constitutional validity of Faretta v. California, 422 U. S. 806 (1975), I note that judges closer to the firing line have sometimes expressed dismay about the practical consequences of that holding. See, e. g., United States v. Farhad, 190 F. 3d 1097, 1107 (CA9 1999) (concurring opinion) (right of self-representation "frequently, though not always, conflicts squarely and inherently with the right to a fair trial"). I have found no empirical research, however, that might help determine whether, in general, the right to represent oneself furthers, or inhibits, the Constitution's basic guarantee of fairness. And without some strong factual basis for believing that Faretta's holding has proved counterproductive in
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