Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 38 (2000)

Page:   Index   Previous  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  Next

204

FRIENDS OF EARTH, INC. v. LAIDLAW ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES (TOC), INC. Scalia, J., dissenting

course precisely the same situation exists here. The principle that "in American jurisprudence . . . a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another" applies no less to prosecution for civil penalties payable to the State than to prosecution for criminal penalties owing to the State.

The Court's opinion reads as though the only purpose and effect of the redressability requirement is to assure that the plaintiff receive some of the benefit of the relief that a court orders. That is not so. If it were, a federal tort plaintiff fearing repetition of the injury could ask for tort damages to be paid not only to himself but to other victims as well, on the theory that those damages would have at least some deterrent effect beneficial to him. Such a suit is preposterous because the "remediation" that is the traditional business of Anglo-American courts is relief specifically tailored to the plaintiff's injury, and not any sort of relief that has some incidental benefit to the plaintiff. Just as a "generalized grievance" that affects the entire citizenry cannot satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement even though it aggrieves the plaintiff along with everyone else, see Lujan, 504 U. S., at 573-574, so also a generalized remedy that deters all future unlawful activity against all persons cannot satisfy the remediation requirement, even though it deters (among other things) repetition of this particular unlawful activity against these particular plaintiffs.

Thus, relief against prospective harm is traditionally afforded by way of an injunction, the scope of which is limited by the scope of the threatened injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U. S. 343, 357-360 (1996); Lyons, 461 U. S, at 105-107, and n. 7. In seeking to overturn that tradition by giving an indionment was that, unlike imprisonment for civil contempt, it would not condition the father's release upon payment. The Court then continued: "The prospect that prosecution will, at least in the future"—i. e., upon completion of the imprisonment—"result in payment of support can, at best, be termed only speculative." Linda R. S., 410 U. S., at 618.

Page:   Index   Previous  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007