Texas v. Lesage, 528 U.S. 18, 4 (1999) (per curiam)

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Cite as: 528 U. S. 18 (1999)

Per Curiam

sent the forbidden consideration. See id., at 287. See also Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U. S. 574, 593 (1998); Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U. S. 668, 675 (1996). Our previous decisions on this point have typically involved alleged retaliation for protected First Amendment activity rather than racial discrimination, but that distinction is immaterial. The underlying principle is the same: The government can avoid liability by proving that it would have made the same decision without the impermissible motive.

Simply put, where a plaintiff challenges a discrete governmental decision as being based on an impermissible criterion and it is undisputed that the government would have made the same decision regardless, there is no cognizable injury warranting relief under § 1983.

Of course, a plaintiff who challenges an ongoing race-conscious program and seeks forward-looking relief need not affirmatively establish that he would receive the benefit in question if race were not considered. The relevant injury in such cases is "the inability to compete on an equal footing." Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U. S. 656, 666 (1993). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peña, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995). But where there is no allegation of an ongoing or imminent constitutional violation to support a claim for forward-looking relief, the government's conclusive demonstration that it would have made the same decision absent the alleged discrimination precludes any finding of liability.

Lesage's second amended complaint sought injunctive relief and alleged that petitioners "have established and are maintaining, under color of the laws of the State of Texas, an affirmative action admissions program at the College of Education that classifies applicants on the basis of race and ethnicity." App. to Pet. for Cert. A-22 (emphasis added). But in deciding that summary judgment was improper, the Court of Appeals did not distinguish between Lesage's retrospective claim for damages and his forward-

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