Cite as: 528 U. S. 259 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
In sum, Robbins must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joins, dissenting.
While I join Justice Souter's cogent dissent without qualification, I write separately to emphasize two points that are obscured by the Court's somewhat meandering explanation of its sharp departure from settled law.
First, despite its failure to say so directly, the Court has effectively overruled both Anders v. California, 386 U. S. 738 (1967), and Penson v. Ohio, 488 U. S. 75 (1988). Second, its unexplained rejection of the reasoning underlying our decision in McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., Dist. 1, 486 U. S. 429 (1988), see ante, at 272-273, illustrates the extent of today's majority's disregard for accepted precedent.
To make my first point it is only necessary to quote the Court's new standard for determining whether a State's appellate procedure affords adequate review for indigent defendants:
"A State's procedure provides such review so long as it reasonably ensures that an indigent's appeal will be resolved in a way that is related to the merit of that appeal." Ante, at 276-277.
The California procedure reviewed in Anders and the Ohio procedure reviewed in Penson—both found inadequate by this Court—would easily have satisfied that standard. Yet the Court today accepts California's current procedure be-rules established pursuant to this Court's supervisory power to administer federal court system from constitutional rules applicable to States); United States v. Cronic, 466 U. S. 648, 665, n. 38 (1984) (same).
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