388
Opinion of the Court
to match a "sufficiently important interest," ibid., though the dollar amount of the limit need not be "fine tun[ed]," id., at 30.3
While we did not attempt to parse distinctions between the speech and association standards of scrutiny for contribution limits, we did make it clear that those restrictions bore more heavily on the associational right than on freedom to speak. Id., at 24-25. We consequently proceeded on the understanding that a contribution limitation surviving a claim of associational abridgment would survive a speech challenge as well, and we held the standard satisfied by the contribution limits under review.
"[T]he prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption" was found to be a "constitutionally sufficient justification," id., at 25-26:
"To the extent that large contributions are given to secure a political quid pro quo from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy is undermined. . . .
"Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. . . . Congress could legiti-3 The quoted language addressed the correlative overbreadth challenge. On the point of classifying the standard of scrutiny, compare Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U. S. 609, 623 (1984) ("Infringements on [the right to associate for expressive purposes] may be justified by regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms"); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963) ("The decisions of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449, 460-461 (1958) ("[S]tate action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny").
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