Cite as: 528 U. S. 49 (1999)
Syllabus
States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U. S. 713, 727. This Court looks initially to state law to determine what rights the taxpayer has in the property the Government seeks to reach, then to federal law to determine whether the taxpayer's state-delineated rights qualify as "property" or "rights to property" within the compass of the federal tax lien legislation. Cf. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U. S. 78, 80. Just as exempt status under state law does not bind the federal collector, United States v. Mitchell, 403 U. S. 190, 204, so federal tax law is not struck blind by a disclaimer, United States v. Irvine, 511 U. S. 224, 240. Pp. 58-59.
(c) The Eighth Circuit, with fidelity to the relevant Code provisions and this Court's case law, determined first what rights state law accorded Drye in his mother's estate. The Court of Appeals observed that under Arkansas law Drye had, at his mother's death, a valuable, transferable, legally protected right to the property at issue, and noted, for example, that a prospective heir may effectively assign his expectancy in an estate under Arkansas law, and the assignment will be enforced when the expectancy ripens into a present estate. Drye emphasizes his undoubted right under Arkansas law to disclaim the inheritance, a right that is indeed personal and not marketable. But Arkansas law primarily gave him a right of considerable value—the right either to inherit or to channel the inheritance to a close family member (the next lineal descendant). That right simply cannot be written off as a mere personal right to accept or reject a gift. In pressing the analogy to a rejected gift, Drye overlooks this crucial distinction. A donee who declines an inter vivos gift restores the status quo ante, leaving the donor to do with the gift what she will. The disclaiming heir or devisee, in contrast, does not restore the status quo, for the decedent cannot be revived. Thus the heir inevitably exercises dominion over the property. He determines who will receive the property— himself if he does not disclaim, a known other if he does. This power to channel the estate's assets warrants the conclusion that Drye held "property" or a "righ[t] to property" subject to the Government's liens under § 6321. Pp. 59-61.
152 F. 3d 892, affirmed.
Ginsburg, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Daniel M. Traylor argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners.
Kent L. Jones argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, As-
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