Cite as: 528 U. S. 62 (2000)
Opinion of Stevens, J.
most responsive and careful manner.3 It is quite evident, therefore, that the Framers did not view this Court as the ultimate guardian of the States' interest in protecting their own sovereignty from impairment by "burdensome" federal laws.4
3 Thus, the present majority's view does more than simply aggrandize the power of the Judicial Branch. It also limits Congress' options for responding with precise attention to state interests when it takes national action. The majority's view, therefore, does not bolster the Framers' plan of structural safeguards for state interests. Rather, it is fundamentally at odds with that plan. Indeed, as Justice Breyer has explained, forbidding private remedies may necessitate the enlargement of the federal bureaucracy and make it more difficult "to decentralize governmental decisionmaking and to provide individual citizens, or local communities, with a variety of enforcement powers." College Savings Bank v. Florida Pre-paid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U. S. 666, 705 (1999) (dissenting opinion); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 976-978 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
4 The President also plays a role in the enactment of federal law, and the Framers likewise provided structural safeguards to protect state interests in the selection of the President. The electors who choose the President are appointed in a manner directed by the state legislatures. Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. And if a majority of electors do not cast their vote for one person, then the President is chosen by the House of Representatives. "But in chusing the President" by this manner, the Constitution directs that "the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representatives from each State having one Vote." Art. II, § 1, cl. 3 (emphasis added); see also Amdt. 12.
Moreover, the Constitution certainly protects state interests in other ways as well, as in the provisions of Articles IV, V, and VII. My concern here, however, is with the respect for state interests safeguarded by the ordinary legislative process. The balance between national and local interests reflected in other constitutional provisions may vary, see, e. g., U. S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U. S. 779 (1995), but insofar as Congress' legislative authority is concerned, the relevant constitutional provisions were crafted to ensure that the process itself adequately accounted for local interests.
I also recognize that the Judicial Branch sometimes plays a role in limiting the product of the legislative process. It may do so, for example, when the exercise of legislative authority runs up against some other con-
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