104
Opinion of the Court
In these cases, petitioners relied on Ray to argue that Washington's more recent state regulations were preempted as well. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that Ray retained little validity in light of subsequent action by Congress. We disagree. The Ray Court's interpretation of the PWSA is correct and controlling. Its basic analytic structure explains why federal pre-emption analysis applies to the challenged regulations and allows scope and due recognition for the traditional authority of the States and localities to regulate some matters of local concern.
At the outset, it is necessary to explain that the essential framework of Ray, and of the PWSA which it interpreted, are of continuing force, neither having been superseded by subsequent authority relevant to these cases. In narrowing the pre-emptive effect given the PWSA in Ray, the Court of Appeals relied upon OPA's saving clauses, finding in their language a return of authority to the States. Title I of OPA contains two saving clauses, stating:
"(a) Preservation of State authorities . . .
"Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 shall—
"(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempting, the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof from imposing any additional liability or requirements with respect to—
"(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil within such State . . . .
. . . . . "(c) Additional requirements and liabilities; penalties "Nothing in this Act, the Act of March 3, 1851 (46 U. S. C. 183 et seq.), or section 9509 of [the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (26 U. S. C. 9509)], shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof—
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