Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 29 (2000)

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390

WILLIAMS v. TAYLOR

Opinion of the Court

way,15 we are convinced that Congress did not intend the statute to produce such a result.

III

In this case, Williams contends that he was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to the effective assistance of counsel when his trial lawyers failed to investigate and to present substantial mitigating evidence to the sentencing jury. The threshold question under AEDPA is whether Williams seeks to apply a rule of law that was clearly established at the time his state-court conviction became final. That question is easily answered because the merits of his claim are squarely governed by our holding in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984).

We explained in Strickland that a violation of the right on which Williams relies has two components:

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Id., at 687.

To establish ineffectiveness, a "defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

15 See, e. g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U. S. 667, 689 (1971); Felker v. Turpin, 518 U. S. 651, 667 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring). Indeed, a contrary rule would be in substantial tension with the interest in uniformity served by Congress' modification in AEDPA of our previous Teague jurisprudence—now the law on habeas review must be "clearly established" by this Court alone. See supra, at 381-382. It would thus seem somewhat perverse to ascribe to Congress the entirely inconsistent policy of perpetuating disparate readings of our decisions under the guise of deference to anything within a conceivable spectrum of reasonableness.

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