400
Opinion of O'Connor, J.
of Terry Williams' application for state habeas corpus relief resulted in just such a decision. I agree with that determination and join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion. Because I disagree, however, with the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) set forth in Part II of Justice Stevens' opinion, I write separately to explain my views.
I
Before 1996, this Court held that a federal court entertaining a state prisoner's application for habeas relief must exercise its independent judgment when deciding both questions of constitutional law and mixed constitutional questions (i. e., application of constitutional law to fact). See, e. g., Miller v. Fenton, 474 U. S. 104, 112 (1985). In other words, a federal habeas court owed no deference to a state court's resolution of such questions of law or mixed questions. In 1991, in the case of Wright v. West, 502 U. S. 1021, we revisited our prior holdings by asking the parties to address the following question in their briefs:
"In determining whether to grant a petition for writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court, should a federal court give deference to the state court's application of law to the specific facts of the petitioner's case or should it review the state court's determination de novo?" Ibid.
Although our ultimate decision did not turn on the answer to that question, our several opinions did join issue on it. See Wright v. West, 505 U. S. 277 (1992).
Justice Thomas, announcing the judgment of the Court, acknowledged that our precedents had "treat[ed] as settled the rule that mixed constitutional questions are 'subject to plenary federal review' on habeas." Id., at 289 (quoting Miller, supra, at 112). He contended, nevertheless, that those decisions did not foreclose the Court from applying a rule of deferential review for reasonableness in future cases.
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