416
Opinion of Rehnquist, C. J.
Court noted the existence of "friends, neighbors and family of [Williams] who would have testified that he had redeeming qualities." Id., at 423. Based on its consideration of all of this evidence, the same trial judge that originally found Williams' death sentence " 'justified and warranted,' " id., at 155, concluded that trial counsel's deficient performance prejudiced Williams, id., at 424, and accordingly recommended that Williams be granted a new sentencing hearing, ibid. The Virginia Supreme Court's decision reveals an obvious failure to consider the totality of the omitted mitigation evidence. See 254 Va., at 26, 487 S. E. 2d, at 200 ("At most, this evidence would have shown that numerous people, mostly relatives, thought that [Williams] was nonviolent and could cope very well in a structured environment"). For that reason, and the remaining factors discussed in the Court's opinion, I believe that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."
Accordingly, although I disagree with the interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) set forth in Part II of Justice Stevens' opinion, I join Parts I, III, and IV of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment of reversal.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas join, concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the Court's interpretation of 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) (1994 ed., Supp. III), see ante, at 402-413 (opinion of O'Connor, J.), but disagree with its decision to grant habeas relief in this case.
There is "clearly established Federal law, as determined by [this Court]" that governs petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). Thus, we must determine whether the Virginia
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