500
Opinion of the Court
We granted certiorari, 526 U. S. 1158 (1999), to resolve a conflict among the Courts of Appeals on the question whether a person injured by an overt act in furtherance of a conspiracy may assert a civil RICO conspiracy claim under § 1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(d) even if the overt act does not constitute "racketeering activity." The majority of the Circuits to consider this question have answered it in the negative. See, e. g., Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., 985 F. 2d 383, 388 (CA8), cert. denied, 508 U. S. 957 (1993); Miranda v. Ponce Fed. Bank, 948 F. 2d 41, 48 (CA1 1991); Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F. 2d 291, 294-295 (CA9 1990), cert. denied, 502 U. S. 921 (1991); Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 897 F. 2d 21, 25 (CA2 1990). Other Circuits have allowed RICO conspiracy claims where the overt act was, as in the instant case, merely the termination of employment, and was not, therefore, racketeering activity. See, e. g., Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Systems, Inc., 130 F. 3d 143, 153-154 (CA5 1997), vacated sub nom. Teel v. Khurana, 525 U. S. 979 (1998); Schiffels v. Kemper Financial Services, Inc., 978 F. 2d 344, 348- 349 (CA7 1992); Shearin v. E. F. Hutton Group, Inc., 885 F. 2d 1162, 1168-1169 (CA3 1989).
II
This case turns on the combined effect of two provisions of RICO that, read in conjunction, provide a civil cause of action for conspiracy. Section 1964(c) states that a cause of action is available to anyone "injured . . . by reason of a violation of section 1962." Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for a person "to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section." To determine what it means to be "injured . . . by reason of" a "conspir[acy]," we turn to the well-established common law of civil conspiracy. As we have said, when Congress uses language with a settled meaning at common law, Congress
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