Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 7 (2000)

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)

Opinion of the Court

that amendment was critical. The "outcry or corroboration" requirement was not satisfied for those convictions; 4 they rested solely on the victim's testimony. Accordingly, the verdicts on those four counts stand or fall depending on whether the child victim exception applies. Under the old law, the exception would not apply, because the victim was more than 14 years old at the time of the alleged offenses. Under the new law, the exception would apply, because the victim was under 18 years old at that time. In short, the validity of four of petitioner's convictions depends on whether the old or new law applies to his case, which, in turn, depends on whether the Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits the application of the new version of Article 38.07 to his case.

As mentioned, only 4 of petitioner's 15 total convictions are implicated by the amendment to Article 38.07; the other 11 counts—including the 2 convictions for which petitioner received life sentences—are uncontested. Six counts are uncontested because they were committed when the victim was under 14 years old, so his convictions stand even under the old law; the other five uncontested counts were committed after the new Texas law went into effect, so there could be no ex post facto claim as to those convictions. See

Sess., ch. 900, § 12.01, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 3765, 3766, and Act of May 10, 1993, 73d Leg., Reg. Sess., ch. 200, § 1, 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 387, 388.

4 The victim did not make an outcry until March 1995, more than six months after the alleged offenses. Although the 1993 amendment to Article 38.07 extended the outcry period from six months to one year, see n. 3, supra, the victim's outcry did not come within that time period either. Accordingly, that change in the outcry provision is immaterial to this case.

The State argues that there is evidence corroborating the victim's testimony, so it does not help petitioner even if the old law applies. See Brief for Respondent 4, n. 2. Before the state court, however, petitioner argued that "there was nothing to corroborate [the victim's] version of events," 963 S. W. 2d 833, 836 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998), and that court accepted the contention as correct for the purposes of its decision. We do the same here.

519

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