Cite as: 529 U. S. 513 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
nesses.32 As explained earlier, see supra, at 517-518, 531- 533, Article 38.07 is a sufficiency of the evidence rule. As such, it does not merely "regulat[e] . . . the mode in which the facts constituting guilt may be placed before the jury," (Rule 601(a) already does that), but governs the sufficiency of those facts for meeting the burden of proof. Indeed, Hopt expressly distinguished witness competency laws from those laws that "alter the degree, or lessen the amount or measure, of the proof which was made necessary to conviction when the crime was committed." 110 U. S., at 589; see also id., at 590 (felon witness law "leav[es] untouched . . . the amount or degree of proof essential to conviction").
It is profitable, in this respect, to compare the statutes in Hopt and Thompson with the text of Article 38.07. The law in Hopt proscribed a " 'rul[e] for determining the competency of witnesses' " that stated " 'persons . . . convict[ed of a] felony . . . shall not be witnesses.' " 110 U. S., at 587-588. The statute in Thompson, similarly, specified that " 'comparison of a disputed writing . . . shall be permitted to be made by witnesses, and such writings . . . may be submitted to the court and jury as evidence.' " 171 U. S., at 381. Article 38.07, however, speaks in terms of whether "[a] convic-32 That subsection contains an exception for "[c]hildren or other persons who, after being examined by the court, appear not to possess sufficient intellect to relate transactions with respect to which they are interrogated."
It is also worth observing that before 1986, Rule 601(a) was codified as Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann., Art. 38.06 (Vernon 1979)—the section immediately preceding the law at issue in this case. (The provision then read: "All persons are competent to testify in criminal cases," and contained a similar exception for child witnesses.) We think it fair to infer that Texas was well aware of the differences in the language used in these adjacent provisions, and understood that the laws served two different functions. The dissent views Article 38.07 as an exception to the general rule of former Article 38.06. It finds it logical that the exception would be placed next to the general rule, post, at 564, n. 8, but does not suggest a reason why it would be logical for the supposed exception to be phrased in language so utterly different from the general rule.
545
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