Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 20 (2000)

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Cite as: 529 U. S. 576 (2000)

Stevens, J., dissenting

"[A] public employer may schedule its nonexempt employees to use their accrued FLSA compensatory time as directed if the prior agreement specifically provides such a provision, and the employees have knowingly and voluntarily agreed to such provision . . . .

"Absent such an agreement, it is our position that neither the statute nor the regulations permit an employer to require an employee to use accrued compensatory time." Opinion Letter from Dept. of Labor, Wage and Hour Div. (Sept. 14, 1992), 1992 WL 845100.

The Department, it should be emphasized, does not suggest that forced-use policies are forbidden by the statute or regulations. Rather, its judgment is simply that, in accordance with the basic rule governing compensatory time set down by the statutory and regulatory scheme, such policies may be pursued solely according to the parties' agreement. Because there is no reason to believe that the Department's opinion was anything but thoroughly considered and consistently observed, it unquestionably merits our respect. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).2

In the end, I do not understand why it should be any more difficult for the parties to come to an agreement on this term of employment than on the antecedent question whether compensatory time may be used at all. State employers enjoy substantial bargaining power in negotiations with their employees; by regulation, agreements governing the availability and use of compensatory time can be essentially as informal as the parties wish. See 29 CFR § 553.23(c) (1999). And, as we have said, employers retain the ability to "cash out" of accrued leave at any time. That simple step is, after all, the method that the Department of Labor years ago suggested the county should pursue here, and that would

2 I should add that I fully agree with Justice Breyer's comments on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837 (1984). See post, at 596-597 (dissenting opinion).

595

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