Cite as: 529 U. S. 61 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
Second, Griffin prohibited comments that suggest a defendant's silence is "evidence of guilt." 380 U. S., at 615 (emphasis added); see also United States v. Robinson, 485 U. S. 25, 32 (1988) (" 'Griffin prohibits the judge and prosecutor from suggesting to the jury that it may treat the defendant's silence as substantive evidence of guilt' " (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 319 (1976))). The prosecutor's comments in this case, by contrast, concerned respondent's credibility as a witness, and were therefore in accord with our longstanding rule that when a defendant takes the stand, "his credibility may be impeached and his testimony assailed like that of any other witness." Brown v. United States, 356 U. S. 148, 154 (1958). "[W]hen [a defendant] assumes the role of a witness, the rules that generally apply to other witnesses—rules that serve the truth-seeking function of the trial—are generally applicable to him as well." Perry v. Leeke, 488 U. S. 272, 282 (1989). See also Reagan v. United States, 157 U. S. 301, 305 (1895).
Respondent points to our opinion in Geders v. United States, 425 U. S. 80, 87-91 (1976), which held that the defendant must be treated differently from other witnesses insofar as sequestration orders are concerned, since sequestration for an extended period of time denies the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. With respect to issues of credibility, however, no such special treatment has been accorded. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U. S. 231 (1980), illustrates the point. There the prosecutor in a first-degree murder trial, during cross-examination and again in closing argument, attempted to impeach the defendant's claim of self-defense by suggesting that he would not have waited two weeks to report the killing if that was what had occurred. In an argument strikingly similar to the one presented here, the defendant in Jenkins claimed that commenting on his prearrest silence violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because "a person facing arrest will not remain silent if his failure to speak later can be used to impeach
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