Cite as: 529 U. S. 694 (2000)
Scalia, J., dissenting
revocation supervisory release given the actual text of subsection (e)(3), and nothing more is pertinent here. Hypothetical discussion of what role § 3583(a) might play had Congress legislated differently is beside the point.
The Court next turns to questions of policy—framed as an inquiry into "congressional purpose." Ante, at 708. Citing legislative history (although not legislative history discussing the particular subsection at issue), ante, at 709-710, the Court explains what it views as the policies Congress seeks to serve with supervised release generally, and then explains how these general policies would be undermined by reading § 3583(e)(3) as written. "Our obligation," the Court says, "is to give effect to congressional purpose so long as the congressional language does not itself bar that result." Ante, at 710, n. 10. I think not. Our obligation is to go as far in achieving the general congressional purpose as the text of the statute fairly prescribes—and no further. We stop where the statutory language does, and do not require explicit prohibition of our carrying the ball a few yards beyond. In any event, as read by any English speaker except one who talks of revoking a dog, the statute does "bar" the result the Court reaches here. The proper canon to govern the present case is quite simple: "[W]here, as here, the statute's language is plain, 'the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms,' " United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485 (1917)).
Perhaps there is a scrivener's error exception to that canon, see, e. g., Holloway v. United States, 526 U. S. 1, 19, n. 2 (1999) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U. S. 504, 527-528 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), but the words of today's author in another case well describe why that is inapplicable here: "This case is a far cry from the rare one where the effect of implementing the ordinary meaning of the statutory text would be patent absurdity or demonstrably at odds with the inten-
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