Cite as: 529 U. S. 765 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
breadth of the "claims" to which the FCA applies 3 only confirms the notion that the law was intended to cover the full range of fraudulent acts, including those perpetrated by States.4
The legislative history of the 1986 amendments discloses that both federal and state officials understood that States were "persons" within the meaning of the statute. Thus, in a section of the 1986 Senate Report describing the history of the Act, the committee unequivocally stated that the Act reaches all parties who may submit false claims and that "[t]he term 'person' is used in its broad sense to include partnerships, associations, and corporations . . . as well as States and political subdivisions thereof." S. Rep. No. 99- 345, pp. 8-9.5
3 Title 31 U. S. C. § 3729(c) reads: "For purposes of this section, 'claim' includes any request or demand, whether under a contract or otherwise, for money or property which is made to a contractor, grantee, or other recipient if the United States Government provides any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded, or if the Government will reimburse such contractor, grantee, or other recipient for any portion of the money or property which is requested or demanded."
4 When Congress amended the FCA in 1986, it noted that "[e]vidence of fraud in Government programs and procurement is on a steady rise." H. R. Rep. No. 99-660, at 18. And at that time, federal grants to state and local governments had totaled over $108 billion. See U. S. Dept. of Commerce National Data Book and Guide to Sources, Statistical Abstract of the United States 301 (108th ed. 1988) (compiling data from 1986). It is therefore difficult to believe, as the Court contends, that Congress intended "to cover all types of fraud, [but not] all types of fraudsters," ante, at 781, n. 10, a conclusion that would exclude from coverage such a large share of potential fraud.
5 Petitioner argues that the Senate Report's statement was simply inaccurate, because the three cases to which the Report cited for support did not interpret the meaning of the word "person" in the FCA. Brief for Petitioner 25-26. The cases stand for the proposition that the statutory term "person" may include States and local governments—exactly the proposition I have discussed above. See supra, at 790. Petitioner's observation that none of the cases cited is directly on point only indicates
793
Page: Index Previous 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007