United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 36 (2000)

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838

UNITED STATES v. PLAYBOY ENTERTAINMENT GROUP, INC.

Breyer, J., dissenting

standable manner," § 504(c)—amounts to transmission into a home. Hence "bleeding" violates the statute whenever a clear transmission of an unrequested adult channel would violate the statute.

Second, the majority's characterization of this statutory scheme as "prohibit[ing] . . . speech" is an exaggeration. Ante, at 812. Rather, the statute places a burden on adult channel speech by requiring the relevant cable operator either to use better scrambling technology, or, if that technology is too expensive, to broadcast only between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m. Laws that burden speech, say, by making speech less profitable, may create serious First Amendment issues, but they are not the equivalent of an absolute ban on speech itself. Cf. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377 (2000). Thus, this Court has upheld laws that do not ban the access of adults to sexually explicit speech, but burden that access through geographical or temporal zoning. See, e. g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U. S. 726 (1978); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U. S. 50 (1976). This Court has also recognized that material the First Amendment guarantees adults the right to see may not be suitable for children. And it has consequently held that legislatures maintain a limited power to protect children by restricting access to, but not banning, adult material. Compare Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U. S. 629 (1968) (upholding ban on sale of pornographic magazines to minors), with Butler v. Michigan, 352 U. S. 380 (1957) (invalidating ban on all books unfit for minors); see also Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U. S. 727, 737-753 (1996) (plurality opinion); Pacifica Foundation, supra, at 748-750; Reno, supra, at 887-889 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The difference—between imposing a burden and enacting a ban—can matter even when strict First Amendment rules are at issue.

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