Cite as: 529 U. S. 861 (2000)
Stevens, J., dissenting
sume that such compliance would be admissible evidence tending to negate charges of negligent and defective design.7 In addition, if Honda were ultimately found liable, such compliance would presumably weigh against an award of punitive damages. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 583-584 (WD Okla. 1979) (concluding that substantial compliance with regulatory scheme did not bar award of punitive damages, but noting that "[g]ood faith belief in, and efforts to comply with, all government regulations would be evidence of conduct inconsistent with the mental state requisite for punitive damages" under state law).8
The parties have not called our attention to any appellate court opinions discussing the merits of similar no-airbag claims despite the fact that airbag technology was available for many years before the promulgation of the 1984 stand-ard—a standard that is not applicable to any automobiles manufactured before September 1, 1986. Given that an arguable basis for a pre-emption defense did not exist until that standard was promulgated, it is reasonable to infer that the manufacturers' assessment of their potential liability for compensatory and punitive damages on such claims—even
cussing problem of basing state tort liability upon compliance with mandatory federal regulatory requirement as question of pre-emption rather than of liability on the merits); Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U. S. 132, 142-143 (1963) ("A holding of federal exclusion of state law is inescapable and requires no inquiry into congressional design where compliance with both federal [regulations and state tort law] is a physical impossibility . . .").
7 Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 4(b), and Comment e (1997); Contini v. Hyundai Motor Co., 840 F. Supp. 22, 23-24 (SDNY 1993). See also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288C, and Comment a (1964) (negligence); McNeil Pharmaceutical v. Hawkins, 686 A. 2d 567, 577-579 (D. C. 1996) (strict liability).
8 The subsequent history of Silkwood does not cast doubt on this premise. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F. 2d 908, 921-923 (CA10 1981) (reversing on ground that federal law pre-empts award of punitive damages), rev'd and remanded, 464 U. S. 238 (1984), on remand, 769 F. 2d 1451, 1457-1458 (CA10 1985).
893
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