Cite as: 530 U. S. 120 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
such offense-related words as referring to an element in this context. Such considerations make this a stronger "separate crime" case than either Jones or Almendarez-Torres—cases in which this Court was closely divided as to Congress' likely intent. Pp. 123-131.
179 F. 3d 321, reversed and remanded.
Breyer, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, and in which Scalia, J., joined except as to point Fourth of Part II.
Stephen P. Halbrook argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs were John F. Carroll, Richard G. Ferguson, Stanley Rentz, and Steven R. Rosen.
Assistant Attorney General Robinson argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Waxman, Deputy Solicitor General Dreeben, Edward C. DuMont, and Joseph C. Wyderko.*
Justice Breyer delivered the opinion of the Court.†
In this case we once again decide whether words in a federal criminal statute create offense elements (determined by a jury) or sentencing factors (determined by a judge). See Jones v. United States, 526 U. S. 227 (1999); AlmendarezTorres v. United States, 523 U. S. 224 (1998). The statute in question, 18 U. S. C. § 924(c) (1988 ed., Supp. V), prohibits the use or carrying of a "firearm" in relation to a crime of violence, and increases the penalty dramatically when the weapon used or carried is, for example, a "machinegun." We conclude that the statute uses the word "machinegun" (and similar words) to state an element of a separate offense.
*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for Law Enforcement Alliance of America, Inc., by Richard E. Gardiner; and for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers et al. by Ann C. McClintock, Kyle O'Dowd, and Barbara Bergman.
†Justice Scalia joins this opinion except as to point Fourth of Part II.
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