Cite as: 530 U. S. 238 (2000)
Syllabus
Salomon's conclusion that, absent a substantive ERISA provision expressly imposing a duty on a nonfiduciary party in interest, the nonfiduciary party may not be held liable under § 502(a)(3), one of ERISA's remedial provisions. Because § 502(a)(3) itself imposes certain duties, liability under that provision does not depend on whether ERISA's substantive provisions impose a specific duty on the party being sued. While § 502(a)(3) does not authorize "appropriate equitable relief" at large, but only for the purpose of "redress[ing any] violations or . . . enforc[ing] any provisions" of ERISA or an ERISA plan, e. g., Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U. S. 349, 353, the section admits of no limit (aside from the "appropriate equitable relief" caveat) on the universe of possible defendants. Indeed, § 502(a)(3) makes no mention at all of which parties may be proper defendants—the focus, instead, is on redressing the "act or practice which violates any provision of [ERISA Title I]." (Emphasis added.) Other provisions of ERISA, by contrast, expressly address who may be a defendant. See, e. g., § 409(a). And, in providing that a "civil action may be brought by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary" (emphasis added), § 502(a) itself demonstrates Congress' care in delineating the universe of plaintiffs who may bring certain civil actions. The matter is conclusively resolved by § 502(l), which provides for assessment by the Secretary of Labor of a civil penalty against a fiduciary or "other person" who knowingly participates in a fiduciary's ERISA violation, defining the amount of such penalty by reference to the amount "ordered by a court to be paid by such . . . other person . . . in a judicial proceeding . . . by the Secretary under subsection . . . (a)(5)." (Emphasis added.) The plain implication is that the Secretary may bring a civil action under § 502(a)(5) against an "other person" who "knowing[ly] participat[es]" in a fiduciary's violation, notwithstanding the absence of any ERISA provision explicitly imposing a duty upon an "other person" not to engage in such knowing participation. It thus follows that a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary may bring suit against an "other person" under the similarly worded subsection (a)(3). See Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U. S. 248, 260. Id., at 261, distinguished. Section 502(l), therefore, refutes the notion that § 502(a)(3) (or (a)(5)) liability hinges on whether the particular defendant labors under a duty expressly imposed by ERISA Title I's substantive provisions. Pp. 245-249.
(b) The Court rejects Salomon's argument that it would contravene common sense for Congress to impose civil liability on a party, such as a nonfiduciary party in interest to a § 406(a) transaction, that is not a "wrongdoer" in the sense of violating a duty expressly imposed by ERISA Title I's substantive provisions. This argument ignores the limiting principle explicit in § 502(a)(3): that the retrospective relief
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