Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327 (2000)

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OCTOBER TERM, 1999

Syllabus

MILLER, SUPERINTENDENT, PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, et al. v. FRENCH et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the seventh circuit

No. 99-224. Argued April 18, 2000—Decided June 19, 2000*

In 1975, prison inmates at Indiana's Pendleton Correctional Facility brought a class action, and the District Court issued an injunction, which remains in effect, to remedy violations of the Eighth Amendment regarding conditions of confinement. Congress subsequently enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA), which, as relevant here, sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. Specifically, 18 U. S. C. § 3626(b)(2) provides that a defendant or intervenor may move to terminate prospective relief under an existing injunction that does not meet that standard; § 3626(b)(3) provides that a court may not terminate such relief if it makes certain findings; and § 3626(e)(2) dictates that a motion to terminate such relief "shall operate as a stay" of that relief beginning 30 days after the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on the motion. In 1997, petitioner prison officials (hereinafter State) filed a motion to terminate the remedial order under § 3626(b). Respondent prisoners moved to enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that § 3626(e)(2) violates due process and separation of powers principles. The District Court enjoined the stay, the State appealed, and the United States intervened to defend § 3626(e)(2)'s constitutionality. In affirming, the Seventh Circuit concluded that § 3626(e)(2) precluded courts from exercising their equitable powers to enjoin the stay, but that the statute, so construed, was unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds.

Held:

1. Congress clearly intended to make operation of the PLRA's automatic stay provision mandatory, precluding courts from exercising their equitable power to enjoin the stay. The Government contends that (1) the Court should not interpret a statute as displacing courts' traditional equitable authority to preserve the status quo pending resolution on the merits absent the clearest command to the contrary and (2) reading § 3626(e)(2) to remove that equitable power would

*Together with No. 99-582, United States v. French et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

327

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