362
Breyer, J., dissenting
I do not argue that this interpretation reflects the most natural reading of the statute's language. Nor do I assert that each individual legislator would have endorsed that reading at the time. But such an interpretation is a reasonable construction of the statute. That reading harmonizes the statute's language with other basic legal principles, including constitutional principles. And, in doing so, it better fits the full set of legislative objectives embodied in the statute than does the more rigid reading that the majority adopts.
For these reasons, I believe that the Solicitor General's more flexible reading is the proper reading of the statute before us. I would consequently vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and remand this action for further proceedings.
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