Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 23 (2000)

Page:   Index   Previous  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  Next

Cite as: 530 U. S. 363 (2000)

Opinion of the Court

This evidence in combination is more than sufficient to show that the state Act stands as an obstacle in addressing the congressional obligation to devise a comprehensive, multilateral strategy.

Our discussion in Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 512 U. S. 298, 327-329 (1994), of the limited weight of evidence of formal diplomatic protests, risk of foreign retaliation, and statements by the Executive does not undercut the point. In Barclays, we had the question of the preemptive effect of federal tax law on state tax law with discriminatory extraterritorial effects. We found the reactions of foreign powers and the opinions of the Executive irrelevant in fathoming congressional intent because Congress had taken specific actions rejecting the positions both of foreign governments, id., at 324-328, and the Executive, id., at 328-329. Here, however, Congress has done nothing to render such evidence beside the point. In consequence, statements of foreign powers necessarily involved in the President's efforts to comply with the federal Act, indications of concrete disputes with those powers, and opinions of senior National Government officials are competent and direct evidence of the frustration of congressional objectives by the state Act.23 Although we do not unquestioningly defer to the legal judgments expressed in Executive Branch statements when determining a federal Act's preemptive charac-David Marchick before the Maryland House of Delegates Committee on Commerce and Government Matters, Mar. 25, 1998, id., at 166 (same).

23 We find support for this conclusion in the statements of the congressional sponsors of the federal Act, who indicated their opinion that inflexible unilateral action would be likely to cause difficulties in our relations with our allies and in crafting an effective policy toward Burma. See n. 17, supra. Moreover, the facts that the Executive specifically called for flexibility prior to the passage of the federal Act, and that the Congress rejected less flexible alternatives and adopted the current law in response to the Executive's communications, bolster the relevance of the Executive's opinion with regard to its ability to accomplish Congress's goals. See n. 9, supra.

385

Page:   Index   Previous  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007