Cite as: 530 U. S. 27 (2000)
Opinion of the Court
than full transactional immunity from prosecution for any offense to which compelled testimony relates could suffice to supplant the privilege. In rejecting that argument, we stressed the importance of § 6002's "explicit proscription" of the use in any criminal case of " 'testimony or other information compelled under the order (or any information directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or other information).' " 406 U. S., at 453. We particularly emphasized the critical importance of protection against a future prosecution " 'based on knowledge and sources of information obtained from the compelled testimony.' " Id., at 454 (quoting Ull-mann v. United States, 350 U. S. 422, 437 (1956)).21
We also re jected the petitioners' argument that derivative-use immunity under § 6002 would not obviate the risk that the prosecutor or other law enforcement officials may use compelled testimony to obtain leads, names of witnesses, or other information not otherwise available to support a prosecution. That argument was predicated on the incorrect assumption that the derivative-use prohibition would prove impossible to enforce. But given that the statute contains a "comprehensive safeguard" in the form of a "sweeping proscription of any use, direct or indirect, of the
21 "Our holding is consistent with the conceptual basis of Counselman. The Counselman statute, as construed by the Court, was plainly deficient in its failure to prohibit the use against the immunized witness of evidence derived from his compelled testimony. The Court repeatedly emphasized this deficiency, noting that the statute: " 'could not, and would not, prevent the use of his testimony to search out other testimony to be used in evidence against him or his property, in a criminal proceeding . . .' 142 U. S., at 564;
. . . . . "and that it: " 'affords no protection against that use of compelled testimony which consists in gaining therefrom a knowledge of the details of a crime, and of sources of information which may supply other means of convicting the witness or party.' 142 U. S., at 586." Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S., at 453-454.
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