Cite as: 530 U. S. 466 (2000)
O'Connor, J., dissenting
make the findings prerequisite to imposition of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court.' " Id., at 647 (quoting Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U. S. 738, 745 (1990)). Relying in part on our decisions rejecting challenges to Florida's capital sentencing scheme, which also provided for sentencing by the trial judge, we added that " 'the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury.' " Walton, supra, at 648 (quoting Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U. S. 638, 640-641 (1989) (per curiam)).
While the Court can cite no decision that would require its "increase in the maximum penalty" rule, Walton plainly rejects it. Under Arizona law, the fact that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists in the defendant's case " 'in-creases the maximum penalty for [the] crime' " of first-degree murder to death. Ante, at 476 (quoting Jones, supra, at 243, n. 6). If the judge does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the maximum punishment authorized by the jury's guilty verdict is life imprisonment. Thus, using the terminology that the Court itself employs to describe the constitutional fault in the New Jersey sentencing scheme presented here, under Arizona law, the judge's finding that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists "ex-poses the criminal defendant to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." Ante, at 483 (emphasis in original). Even Justice Thomas, whose vote is necessary to the Court's opinion today, agrees on this point. See ante, at 522 (concurring opinion). If a State can remove from the jury a factual determination that makes the difference between life and death, as Walton holds that it can, it is inconceivable why a State cannot do the same with respect to a factual determination that results in only a 10-year increase in the maximum sentence to which a defendant is exposed.
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