Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 46 (2000)

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748

HILL v. COLORADO

Scalia, J., dissenting

the abortion. But that is not an effect which occurs "without reference to the content" of the speech. This singling out of presumptively "unwelcome" communications fits precisely the description of prohibited regulation set forth in Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312, 321 (1988): It "targets the direct impact of a particular category of speech, not a secondary feature that happens to be associated with that type of speech." (Emphasis added.2)

In sum, it blinks reality to regard this statute, in its application to oral communications, as anything other than a content-based restriction upon speech in the public forum. As such, it must survive that stringent mode of constitutional analysis our cases refer to as "strict scrutiny," which requires that the restriction be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. See United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 813 (2000); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 45 (1983). Since the Court does not even attempt to support the regulation under this standard, I shall discuss it only briefly. Suffice it to say that if protecting people from un-2 The Court's contention that the statute is content neutral because it is not a " 'regulation of speech' " but a "regulation of the places where some speech may occur," ante, at 719 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989)), is simply baffling. First, because the proposition that a restriction upon the places where speech may occur is not a restriction upon speech is both absurd and contradicted by innumerable cases. See, e. g., Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U. S. 753 (1994); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191 (1992); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474 (1988); Boos v. Barry, 485 U. S. 312 (1988); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455 (1980); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U. S. 104 (1972); Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). And second, because the fact that a restriction is framed as a "regulation of the places where some speech may occur" has nothing whatever to do with whether the restriction is content neutral—which is why Boos held to be content based the ban on displaying, within 500 feet of foreign embassies, banners designed to " 'bring into public odium any foreign government.' " 485 U. S., at 316.

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