Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 80 (2000)

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Cite as: 530 U. S. 793 (2000)

Souter, J., dissenting

B

These concerns are reflected in the Court's classic summation delivered in Everson v. Board of Education, supra, its first opinion directly addressing standards governing aid to religious schools: 3

"The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and State.' " 330 U. S., at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 164 (1879)).

The most directly pertinent doctrinal statements here are these: no government "can pass laws which aid one religion

3 The Court upheld payments by Indian tribes to apparently Roman Catholic schools in Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U. S. 50 (1908), suggesting in dicta that there was no Establishment Clause problem, but it did not squarely face the question. Nor did the Court address a First Amendment challenge to a state program providing textbooks to children in Cochran v. Louisiana Bd. of Ed., 281 U. S. 370 (1930); it simply concluded that the program had an adequate public purpose. The Court first squarely faced the issue in Everson.

873

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