228
Per Curiam
tively." Id., at 222. We granted certiorari to determine whether Fiore's conviction was inconsistent with the Due Process Clause. 526 U. S. 1038 (1999).
II
Because we were uncertain whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Scarpone's case represented a change in the law of Pennsylvania, we certified the following question to that court:
"Does the interpretation of Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 35, § 6018.401(a) (Purdon 1993), set forth in Commonwealth v. Scarpone, 535 Pa. 273, 279, 634 A. 2d 1109, 1112 (1993), state the correct interpretation of the law of Pennsylvania at the date Fiore's conviction became final?" 528 U. S., at 29.
We received the following reply:
"Scarpone did not announce a new rule of law. Our ruling merely clarified the plain language of the statute. . . . Our interpretation of [§ 6018.401(a)] in Scarpone furnishes the proper statement of law at the date Fiore's conviction became final." Fiore v. White, 562 Pa. 634, 646, 757 A. 2d 842, 848-849 (2000) (citation omitted).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's reply specifies that the interpretation of § 6018.401(a) set out in Scarpone "merely clarified" the statute and was the law of Pennsylvania—as properly interpreted—at the time of Fiore's conviction. Because Scarpone was not new law, this case presents no issue of retroactivity. Rather, the question is simply whether Pennsylvania can, consistently with the Federal Due Process Clause, convict Fiore for conduct that its criminal statute, as properly interpreted, does not prohibit.
This Court's precedents make clear that Fiore's conviction and continued incarceration on this charge violate due process. We have held that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
Page: Index Previous 1 2 3 4 5 NextLast modified: October 4, 2007