Cite as: 531 U. S. 326 (2001)
Souter, J., concurring
III
In sum, the police officers in this case had probable cause to believe that a home contained contraband, which was evidence of a crime. They reasonably believed that the home's resident, if left free of any restraint, would destroy that evidence. And they imposed a restraint that was both limited and tailored reasonably to secure law enforcement needs while protecting privacy interests. In our view, the restraint met the Fourth Amendment's demands.
The judgment of the Illinois Appellate Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
Justice Souter, concurring.
I join the Court's opinion subject to this afterword on two points: the constitutionality of a greater intrusion than the one here and the permissibility of choosing impoundment over immediate search. Respondent McArthur's location made the difference between the exigency that justified temporarily barring him from his own dwelling and circumstances that would have supported a greater interference with his privacy and property. As long as he was inside his trailer, the police had probable cause to believe that he had illegal drugs stashed as his wife had reported and that with any sense he would flush them down the drain before the police could get a warrant to enter and search. This probability of destruction in anticipation of a warrant exemplifies the kind of present risk that undergirds the accepted exigent circumstances exception to the general warrant requirement. Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 770-771 (1966). That risk would have justified the police in entering McArthur's trailer promptly to make a lawful, warrantless search. United States v. Santana, 427 U. S. 38, 42-43 (1976); Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U. S. 294, 298-299 (1967). When McArthur stepped
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