84
Opinion of the Court
she lacked the resources to arbitrate and, as a result, would have to forgo her claims against petitioners. See Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Record Doc. No. 53, p. 9. The District Court denied reconsideration. 991 F. Supp., at 1425-1426. Randolph appealed.
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit first held that it had jurisdiction to review the District Court's order because that order was a final decision. 178 F. 3d 1149 (1999). The Court of Appeals looked to § 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U. S. C. § 16, which governs appeal from a district court's arbitration order, and specifically § 16(a)(3), which allows appeal from "a final decision with respect to an arbitration that is subject to this title." The court determined that a final, appealable order within the meaning of the FAA is one that disposes of all the issues framed by the litigation, leaving nothing to be done but execute the order. The Court of Appeals found the District Court's order within that definition.
The court then determined that the arbitration agreement failed to provide the minimum guarantees that respondent could vindicate her statutory rights under the TILA. Critical to this determination was the court's observation that the arbitration agreement was silent with respect to payment of filing fees, arbitrators' costs, and other arbitration expenses. On that basis, the court held that the agreement to arbitrate posed a risk that respondent's ability to vindicate her statutory rights would be undone by "steep" arbitration costs, and therefore was unenforceable. We granted certiorari, 529 U. S. 1052 (2000), and we now affirm the Court of Appeals with respect to the first conclusion, and reverse it with respect to the second.
II
Section 16 of the Federal Arbitration Act, enacted in 1988, governs appellate review of arbitration orders. 9 U. S. C. § 16. It provides:
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