Cite as: 532 U. S. 105 (2001)
Souter, J., dissenting
The Court cites FTC v. Bunte Brothers, Inc., 312 U. S. 349 (1941), United States v. American Building Maintenance Industries, 422 U. S. 271 (1975), and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U. S. 186 (1974), for the proposition that "engaged in" has acquired a more restricted meaning as a term of art, immune to tampering now. Ante, at 117-118. But none of the cited cases dealt with the question here, whether exemption language is to be read as petrified when coverage language is read to grow. Nor do the cases support the Court's unwillingness to look beyond the four corners of the statute to determine whether the words in question necessarily " 'have a uniform meaning whenever used by Congress,' " ante, at 118 (quoting American Building Maintenance, supra, at 277). Compare ante, at 119 ("[W]e need not assess the legislative history of the exclusion provision"), with, e. g., American Building Maintenance, supra, at 279- 283 (examining legislative history and agency enforcement of the Clayton Act before resolving meaning of "engaged in commerce").
The Court has no good reason, therefore, to reject a reading of "engaged in" as an expression of intent to legislate to the full extent of the commerce power over employment contracts. The statute is accordingly entitled to a coherent reading as a whole, see, e. g., King v. St. Vincent's Hospital, 502 U. S. 215, 221 (1991), by treating the exemption for employment contracts as keeping pace with the expanded understanding of the commerce power generally.
II
The second hurdle is cleared more easily still, and the Court has shown how. Like some Courts of Appeals before it, the majority today finds great significance in the fact that the generally phrased exemption for the employment contracts of workers "engaged in commerce" does not stand alone, but occurs at the end of a sequence of more specific
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