Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 33 (2001)

Page:   Index   Previous  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  Next

262

EASLEY v. CROMARTIE

Thomas, J., dissenting

evidence misses the mark. Although we have recognized that particular weight should be given to a trial court's credibility determinations, we have never held that factual findings based on documentary evidence and expert testimony justify "extensive review," ante, at 243. On the contrary, we explained in Anderson that "[t]he rationale for deference . . . is not limited to the superiority of the trial judge's position to make determinations of credibility." 470 U. S., at 574. See also Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 52(a) (specifically referring to oral and documentary evidence). Instead, the rationale for deference extends to all determinations of fact because of the trial judge's "expertise" in making such determinations. 470 U. S., at 574. Accordingly, deference to the factfinder "is the rule, not the exception," id., at 575, and I see no reason to depart from this rule in the case before us now.

Finally, perhaps the best evidence that the Court has emptied clear error review of meaningful content in the redistricting context (and the strongest testament to the fact that the District Court was dealing with a complex fact pattern) is the Court's foray into the minutiae of the record. I do not doubt this Court's ability to sift through volumes of facts or to argue its interpretation of those facts persuasively. But I do doubt the wisdom, efficiency, increased accuracy, and legitimacy of an extensive review that is any more searching than clear error review. See id., 574-575 ("Duplication of the trial judge's efforts . . . would very likely contribute only negligibly to the accuracy of fact determination at a huge cost in diversion of judicial resources"). Thus, I would follow our precedents and simply review the District Court's finding for clear error.

II

Reviewing for clear error, I cannot say that the District Court's view of the evidence was impermissible.3 First, the

3 I assume, because the District Court did, that the goal of protecting incumbents is legitimate, even where, as here, individuals are incumbents

Page:   Index   Previous  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  Next

Last modified: October 4, 2007