284
Opinion of the Court
that respondents say the "actual language" of Guardians resolves. Neither that case,4 nor any other in this Court, has held that the private right of action exists.
Nor does it follow straightaway from the three points we have taken as given that Congress must have intended a private right of action to enforce disparate-impact regulations. We do not doubt that regulations applying § 601's ban on intentional discrimination are covered by the cause of action to enforce that section. Such regulations, if valid and reasonable, authoritatively construe the statute itself, see NationsBank of N. C., N. A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U. S. 251, 257 (1995); Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, 843-844 (1984), and it is therefore meaningless to talk about a separate cause of action to enforce the regulations apart from the statute. A Congress that intends the statute to be enforced through a private cause of action intends the authoritative interpretation of the statute to be so enforced as well. The many cases that respondents say have "assumed" that a cause of action to enforce a statute includes one to enforce its regulations illustrate (to the extent that cases in which an issue was not presented can illustrate anything) only this point; each involved regulations of the type we have just described, as respondents conceded at oral argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 33. See National Collegiate Athletic Assn. v. Smith, 525 U. S. 459, 468 (1999) (regulation defining who is a "recipient" under Title IX); School Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Ar-line, 480 U. S. 273, 279-281 (1987) (regulations defining the terms "physical impairment" and "major life activities" in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973); Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U. S. 385, 408-409 (1986) (White, J., joined by four other
ately after this concluding sentence, see id., at 645, n. 18—makes clear that the omission was not accidental.
4 Ultimately, the dissent agrees that "the holding in Guardians does not compel the conclusion that a private right of action exists to enforce the Title VI regulations against private parties . . . ." Post, at 301.
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