Cite as: 532 U. S. 394 (2001)
Syllabus
§ 2254 petition can be (and has been) construed as asserting a challenge to the 1990 sentence he is currently serving, as enhanced by the allegedly invalid 1986 convictions. See Maleng v. Cook, 490 U. S. 488, 493. Thus, he satisfies § 2254's "in custody" requirement. Pp. 401-402.
(b) The more important question here is the one left unanswered in Maleng: the extent to which a prior expired conviction may be subject to challenge in an attack upon a current sentence it was used to enhance. In Daniels v. United States, ante, p. 374, this Court held that a federal prisoner who has failed to pursue available remedies to challenge a prior conviction (or has done so unsuccessfully) may not collaterally attack that conviction through a motion under 28 U. S. C. § 2255 directed at the enhanced federal sentence. That holding is now extended to cover § 2254 petitions directed at enhanced state sentences. The considerations on which the Daniels holding was grounded—finality of convictions and ease of administration—are equally present in the § 2254 context. See Daniels, ante, at 379-380. Pp. 402-404.
(c) As in Daniels, an exception exists to the general rule for § 2254 petitions that challenge an enhanced sentence on the basis that the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, as set forth in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335. The failure to appoint counsel is a unique constitutional defect, rising to the level of a jurisdictional defect, which therefore warrants special treatment among alleged constitutional violations. Moreover, an exception for Gideon claims does not implicate this Court's concerns about administrative ease. As with any § 2254 petition, a petitioner making a Gideon challenge must satisfy the procedural prerequisites for relief, including exhaustion of remedies. Pp. 404-405.
O'Connor, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III-A, and IV, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ., joined, an opinion with respect to Part III-C, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy and Thomas, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III-B, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Kennedy, J., joined. Souter, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which Stevens and Ginsburg, JJ., joined, post, p. 408. Breyer, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 410.
William P. O'Malley argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief were Eugene M. Talerico and Andrew J. Jarbola III.
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