532
Opinion of the Court
showing that there is a "need . . . of the highest order" for a rule supplementing the traditional means of deterring antisocial conduct. The justification for any such novel burden on expression must be "far stronger than mere speculation about serious harms." United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U. S. 454, 475 (1995).18 Accordingly, the Govern-ment's first suggested justification for applying § 2511(1)(c) to an otherwise innocent disclosure of public information is plainly insufficient.19
The Government's second argument, however, is considerably stronger. Privacy of communication is an important interest, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S. 539, 559 (1985),20 and Title III's restrictions are intended to protect that interest, thereby "encouraging the uninhibited exchange of ideas and information among private parties . . . ." Brief for United States 27. More-18 Indeed, even the burden of justifying restrictions on commercial speech requires more than " 'mere speculation or conjecture.' " Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Assn., Inc. v. United States, 527 U. S. 173, 188 (1999).
19 Our holding, of course, does not apply to punishing parties for obtaining the relevant information unlawfully. "It would be frivolous to assert—and no one does in these cases—that the First Amendment, in the interest of securing news or otherwise, confers a license on either the reporter or his news sources to violate valid criminal laws. Although stealing documents or private wiretapping could provide newsworthy information, neither reporter nor source is immune from conviction for such conduct, whatever the impact on the flow of news." Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 691 (1972).
20 " 'The essential thrust of the First Amendment is to prohibit improper restraints on the voluntary public expression of ideas; it shields the man who wants to speak or publish when others wish him to be quiet. There is necessarily, and within suitably defined areas, a concomitant freedom not to speak publicly, one which serves the same ultimate end as freedom of speech in its affirmative aspect.' " Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U. S., at 559 (quoting Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N. Y. 2d 341, 348, 244 N. E. 2d 250, 255 (1968)).
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