Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 41 (2001)

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554

BARTNICKI v. VOPPER

Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting

v. United States Dist. Court for Eastern Dist. of Mich., 407 U. S. 297, 302 (1972), these statutes further the "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" speech of the private parties, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964). Unlike the laws at issue in the Daily Mail cases, which served only to protect the identities and actions of a select group of individuals, these laws protect millions of people who communicate electronically on a daily basis. The chilling effect of the Court's decision upon these private conversations will surely be great: An estimated 49.1 million analog cellular telephones are currently in operation. See Hao, Nokia Profits from Surge in Cell Phones, Fla. Today, July 18, 1999, p. E1.

Although the Court recognizes and even extols the virtues of this right to privacy, see ante, at 532-533, these are "mere words," W. Shakespeare, Troilus and Cressida, act v, sc. 3, overridden by the Court's newfound right to publish unlawfully acquired information of "public concern," ante, at 525. The Court concludes that the private conversation between Gloria Bartnicki and Anthony Kane is somehow a "debate . . . . worthy of constitutional protection." Ante, at 535. Perhaps the Court is correct that "[i]f the statements about the labor negotiations had been made in a public arena—during a bargaining session, for example— they would have been newsworthy." Ante, at 525. The point, however, is that Bartnicki and Kane had no intention of contributing to a public "debate" at all, and it is perverse to hold that another's unlawful interception and knowing disclosure of their conversation is speech "worthy of constitutional protection." Cf. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U. S. 557, 573 (1995) ("[O]ne important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say' "). The Constitution should not protect the involuntary broadcast of personal conversations. Even where the communications involve public figures or

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