Cite as: 532 U. S. 67 (2001)
Opinion of the Court
The critical difference between those four drug-testing cases and this one, however, lies in the nature of the "special need" asserted as justification for the warrantless searches. In each of those earlier cases, the "special need" that was advanced as a justification for the absence of a warrant or individualized suspicion was one divorced from the State's general interest in law enforcement.15 This point was em-receiving needed medical care. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 599-600 (1977). Cf. Poland, Dombrowski, Ager, & Sokol, Punishing pregnant drug users: enhancing the flight from care, 31 Drug and Alcohol Dependence 199-203 (1993).
15 As The Chief Justice recently noted: "The 'special needs' doctrine, which has been used to uphold certain suspicionless searches performed for reasons unrelated to law enforcement, is an exception to the general rule that a search must be based on individualized suspicion of wrong-doing." Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U. S. 32, 54 (2000) (dissenting opinion); see also nn. 16-17, infra. In T. L. O., we made a point of distinguishing searches "carried out by school authorities acting alone and on their own authority" from those conducted "in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies." 469 U. S., at 341, n. 7.
The dissent, however, relying on Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U. S. 868 (1987), argues that the special needs doctrine "is ordinarily employe[d], precisely to enable searches by law enforcement officials who, of course, ordinarily have a law enforcement objective." Post, at 100. Viewed in the context of our special needs case law and even viewed in isolation, Griffin does not support the proposition for which the dissent invokes it. In other special needs cases, we have tolerated suspension of the Fourth Amendment's warrant or probable-cause requirement in part because there was no law enforcement purpose behind the searches in those cases, and there was little, if any, entanglement with law enforcement. See Skinner, 489 U. S., at 620-621; Von Raab, 489 U. S., at 665-666; Acton, 515 U. S., at 658. Moreover, after our decision in Griffin, we reserved the question whether "routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained pursuant to the administrative scheme would give rise to an inference of pretext, or otherwise impugn the administrative nature of the . . . program." Skinner, 489 U. S., at 621, n. 5. In Griffin itself, this Court noted that "[a]lthough a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the ordinary citizen." 483 U. S., at 876. Finally, we agree with petitioners
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